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MORE THAN JUST A PRIVATE
AFFAIR:  IS THE PRACTICE OF
INCARCERATING ALASKA
PRISONERS IN PRIVATE OUT-OF-
STATE PRISONS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
This Note examines the constitutionality of Alaska’s current pol-
icy of transferring Alaska state prisoners to privately run prisons
in other states.  The Note describes the developing interplay be-
tween federal law, state law, and the rights of the incarcerated.
The Note then introduces a 1997 Alaska Supreme Court case,
Brandon v. State Department of Corrections, and draws from the
decision’s interpretation of the Alaska Constitution to emphasize
how the rights of Alaska state prisoners may surpass those granted
by federal law, and that a right to rehabilitation is an intrinsic
right granted to all Alaska prisoners.  The Note proceeds to dem-
onstrate that the right to receive visitors is an integral element of
the right to rehabilitation, and that Alaskans transferred to out-of-
state prisons are deprived of this constitutional right.  The Note
concludes by lauding the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in
Brandon for its recognition of the rights of all Alaskans, including
Alaska prisoners, but warns that this single decision may not be
enough to protect the constitutional guarantees granted to all state
citizens, and that additional attention to the problem is required.
I.  INTRODUCTION
In 1997, Richard Brandon, an Alaska prisoner, was serving
twenty-five years at Alaska’s Spring Creek Correctional Center
prison for a 1990 conviction.1  Because of overcrowding, the De-
partment of Corrections (“DOC”) entered into a contract with
Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”) whereby CCA
would transfer approximately 200 Alaska prisoners to its Central
Copyright © 2000 by Shymeka L. Hunter.  This Note is also available on the
Internet at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/17ALRHunter.
1. See Brandon v. State Dep’t of Corr., 938 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Alaska 1997).
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Arizona Detention Center in Florence, Arizona.2  When the DOC
failed to solicit enough volunteers to transfer to Arizona, it selected
additional inmates based on the length of their remaining sen-
tences.3  Brandon was selected from a group of inmates with seven
and one-half or more years remaining.4
Shortly thereafter, a classification hearing was held to deter-
mine if Brandon would actually be transferred to Arizona.5  De-
spite noting that Brandon’s family visited him weekly, the hearing
officer recommended that the DOC transfer Brandon to Arizona,
where visitation would be virtually impossible.6  The DOC followed
the hearing officer’s recommendation, and Brandon appealed to
the DOC commissioner.7  When Brandon’s appeal was denied, he
filed a petition with the superior court on the ground that his ap-
peal to the DOC commissioner was arbitrarily rejected.8  Believing
that Brandon’s transfer decision was the result of an administrative
hearing not subject to judicial review, as opposed to a judicially re-
viewable adjudicative proceeding, the superior court dismissed
Brandon’s case for lack of jurisdiction.9  At that point, Brandon
had already been transferred to Arizona.10
Brandon claimed that his transfer substantially impaired his
rehabilitation in violation of the Alaska Constitution and Alaska
Statutes section 33.30.061.11  The Alaska Supreme Court held that
because Brandon’s fundamental right to rehabilitation was argua-
bly at stake, the superior court could review the results of a classifi-
cation hearing.12  The court found that the superior court’s jurisdic-
tion is established by a prisoner’s “right to judicial review of major
disciplinary proceedings when issues of constitutional magnitude
are raised.”13  The court reasoned that housing Alaska prisoners in
private Arizona prisons is an issue of constitutional magnitude be-
2. See id.  CCA is a private entity engaged in the prison business.  Founded in
1983, the publicly traded company boasts of being “the leading private sector
provider of detention and corrections services to federal, state and local
governments.”  Company Overview (visited Oct. 1, 2000) <http://www.
correctionscorp.com/info.html>.
3. See Brandon, 938 P.2d at 1030.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 1031.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 1032.
12. See id. at 1033.
13. Id. at 1031 (quoting Hertz v. Carothers, 784 P.2d 659, 660 (Alaska 1990)).
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cause the Alaska Constitution grants prisoners a constitutional
right to rehabilitation, of which the right of visitation is a vital
component.14  According to the court, the distance between Alaska
and Arizona seriously impedes visitation and, thus, inhibits reha-
bilitation.15  In essence, because a transfer to Arizona effectively
prevents visitation, which is a key element of rehabilitation, the
commissioner’s decision to transfer Brandon to Arizona put Bran-
don’s constitutional rights at risk.16
Brandon represents the first time that the Alaska Supreme
Court has squarely faced this issue, and no other court appears to
have addressed this issue since then.  It demonstrates the supreme
court’s commitment to respecting fundamental constitutional rights
for all Alaskans, including Alaska prisoners.  Brandon is only a
starting point, however; more is needed to assure that prisoners’
constitutional rights are safeguarded.  Indeed, with nothing more
than the Brandon emphasis on prisoners’ right to a fair hearing be-
fore being transferred out-of-state, the prisoners’ constitutional
rights may be virtually nullified by Alaska’s reliance upon private
prisons — a thousand miles away — to house Alaska prisoners.
This Note addresses this important issue.  Part II presents an
historical background that explains why the private sector plays
such an intimate role in the correction process and a summary of
the current debate surrounding the privatization of prisons.17  Part
14. See id. at 1032.
15. See id.  This Note focuses on transfers of prison inmates from Alaska to
Arizona primarily because it forms the basis for the dispute in Brandon.  How-
ever, given Alaska’s isolation from the contiguous United States, all analyses and
conclusions would apply to any transfer outside of Alaska.  As for transfers be-
tween states in close proximity within the contiguous U.S., creating a “bright-line”
rule based on geographical borders may not be the best method of addressing the
impact of distance on the right to receive visitors.  For example, instead of pre-
venting out-of-state transfers, other states may consider preventing out-of-state
transfers that exceed the distance between the prisoner’s home and the most dis-
tant in-state facility.  Of course, the need to limit gross restrictions on visitation is
contingent upon a state law that grants prisoners a right to rehabilitation.  Addi-
tionally, because the analysis in this Note relies heavily on the principle of reha-
bilitation accomplished through visitation, it may be inapplicable for capital de-
fendants.
16. See id. at 1034 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting in part).
17. A body of literature exists that addresses in detail the controversies un-
derlying the differences between private and public prisons.  See generally Charles
H. Logan, Well Kept: Comparing Quality of Confinement in Private and Public
Prisons, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 577 (1992); Ira P. Robbins, The Legal
Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531 (1989); Robert L.
Wilkins, Federal Influence on Sentencing Policy in the District of Columbia: An
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III traces the development of federal and Alaska law governing the
transfer of prisoners across state lines.  Part IV recounts the hold-
ing in Brandon in greater detail, and Part V provides an analysis of
why it is unconstitutional to transfer Alaska prisoners to private
out-of-state facilities.  This Note will argue that because the right to
visitation is crucial to rehabilitation, and transfers outside of
Alaska severely impede visitation, these out-of-state transfers are
de facto unconstitutional.
II.  THE EMERGENCE OF THE PRIVATE PRISON INDUSTRY
Understanding the significance of Brandon requires that one
examine the intimate role the private sector plays in the correc-
tional system.  Indeed, privatization of the prison system encour-
ages out-of-state transfers because private entities can choose to
build prisons in states that offer the most economic benefits.  These
out-of-state private entities are then able to enter into contracts
with correctional systems in other states to house prisoners.  As de-
scribed below, many states consider this a viable option to address
massive overcrowding.  Section A examines the recent problem of
prison overcrowding.  Section B looks at the historical relationship
between correctional institutions and the private sector.  Section C
summarizes the debate over the private prison industry.
A. Prison Overcrowding18
Between 1988 and 1997, the number of people incarcerated in
the United States nearly doubled, skyrocketing from 627,600 in
1988 to 1,244,554 prisoners in 1997.19  This dramatic increase re-
Oppressive and Dangerous Experiment, 2 FED. SENT. R. 143 (1999); Brian B. Ev-
ans, Comment, Private Prisons, 36 EMORY L.J. 253 (1987); James L. Ahlstrom,
Note, McKnight v. Rees: Delineating the Qualified Immunity “Haves” and “Have-
Nots” Among Private Parties, 1997 BYU L. REV. 385 (1997); John G. Di Piano,
Note, Private Prisons: Can They Work?  Panopticon in the Twenty-First Century,
21 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINE. 171 (1995); Douglass W. Dunham, Note,
Inmates’ Rights and the Privatization of Prisons, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1475 (1986).
18.   Although more recent prison statistics are available, this Note relies pri-
marily on statistics between 1988 and 1997 for several reasons.  First, the most
drastic increase in prison rates occurred during this time period.  Second, Brandon
was decided during this decade.  Finally, statistics regarding prisoners have not
changed significantly since 1997, especially with regard to the overall state and
federal capacity rates.  For more recent statistics, see Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in
1999, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Aug. 2000 [hereinafter Prisoners in 1999].
19. See Growth in Corrections: State, National and International Numbers, 15
ALASKA JUST. F. 4, 1 (1999) [hereinafter Growth in Corrections].  By the end of
1999, the number of prisoners incarcerated in the United States had increased to
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sulted largely from legislative acts that advocate getting “tough on
crime” through such avenues as severe intolerance for drugs and
weapons violations,20 mandatory minimum sentencing, preventive
detention, habitual offender statutes, and reduced use of parole.21
While virtually every state experienced increased rates of in-
carceration during the last decade, Alaska was especially notable.22
In 1997, Alaska’s incarceration rate increased by over 13%, the
third largest increase in the nation.23  By 1998, Alaska’s alarming
rate of incarceration had increased by 18%, which was 2% more
than the state’s overall population increase rate.24  Although
Alaska’s rate of incarceration decreased by 3.6% in 1999, the state
still complained of severe prison overcrowding.25
At the same time that incarceration rates were skyrocketing,
the electorate became increasingly hostile to new taxes and con-
struction bonds, the most popular methods of financing state and
local prison projects.26  This combination resulted in massive prison
overcrowding.27  By the end of 1997, the federal prison system
complained that it was functioning at 19% over capacity.28  Mean-
while, state prisons were at least equally overburdened, functioning
at 24% over capacity.29  Specifically, thirty-six states complained
that their prisons were at 100% capacity or more while Washing-
ton, D.C., and several other states were 99% full.30  New Mexico,
1,366,721.  See Prisoners in 1999, supra note 18, at 1 (noting that this number re-
flects those incarcerated under state or federal adult correctional authorities).
20. See Darrell K. Gilliard & Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 1997, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, Aug. 1998, at 12.  Sixty percent of federal prisoners incarcer-
ated in 1996 were serving time for drug violations, and the number of inmates
serving sentences for weapons violations doubled between 1990 and 1996.  See id.
21. See Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Pri-
vatization, 35 UCLA L. REV. 911, 911 (1988).
22. See Prisoners in 1997: The State and Federal Picture (A BJS Report), 15
ALASKA JUST. F. 2, 2 (1998).
23. See id.  Maine tied with Alaska for the number three spot.  Hawai’i ranked
first and West Virginia ranked second, with incarceration rates of 23.4% and
15.4%, respectively.  See id.  When considering Alaska’s inmate population, it is
important to note that unlike most states, the federal and state prison system in
Alaska is unified.  See id.
24. See Growth in Corrections, supra note 19, at 1.
25. See Prisoners in 1999, supra note 18, at 4-8.
26. See David N. Wecht, Breaking the Code of Deference: Judicial Review of
Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 815, 816-17 & n.10 (1987).
27. See id. at 816-18.
28. See Gilliard & Beck, supra note 20, at 9.
29. See id.
30. See id.
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functioning at 82% of its capacity, was in the nation’s best position
while California, whose prisons were 206% full, was in the worst.31
Not far behind California, the Alaska prison system was operating
at 147% of capacity.32
With such massive overcrowding problems, the federal gov-
ernment and the states urgently began to explore new methods of
housing prisoners.33  Promising reduced costs, expediency, and bet-
ter conditions overall, the private sector seemed like an obvious
remedy for this virtually insatiable need for prison space.34  In addi-
tion, the long relationship between the private sector and the
prison system made this choice even more attractive.  Subsection B
explores this relationship.
B. The Private Sector’s Continuing Role in Correctional
Institutions35
While Alaska’s use of out-of-state private prisons to house in-
mates is a very recent phenomenon, the relationship between cor-
rectional institutions and the private sector dates back to the na-
tion’s beginnings.36  During the early republic, private jailers
housed criminals because the new nation was unable to do so.37  By
the early nineteenth century, private entities controlled the entire
prison industry in some states.38  This control was exhibited primar-
ily through leases, as states leased prison systems to private enti-
31. See id. at 8.
32. See id.
33. See Wecht, supra note 26, at 816-17.  While the dangers of operating a
prison system above capacity are evident, even states like New Mexico that are
not at full capacity may have significant problems.  For example, they may be un-
able to provide space for protective custody and disciplinary cases or for emergen-
cies.  See Gilliard & Beck, supra note 20, at 8.
34. See Wecht, supra note 26, at 816-17.
35. In cataloging this history, this Note relies heavily on Joseph Field, Making
Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 649 (1987).
36. See id. at 651.
37. See Wecht, supra note 26, at 815-16.
38. See Ward M. McAfee, Symposium: Privatization of Prisons, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 851, 852-53 (1987) (noting that during the nineteenth century, Alabama,
California, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Oregon, and Wyoming had lease systems whereby private entities con-
tracted with the states to use prisoner labor).
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ties.39  Private entities generated profits primarily by using prison
labor to manufacture goods or to provide services.40
As the nineteenth century came to an end, the use of the pri-
vate sector to house prisoners was rapidly declining, and the gov-
ernment role in administering prisons increased.41  Additionally,
some states discovered that the financial benefits they had hoped
to gain from turning the prison system over to the private sector
were illusory.42  Concerns about abusive conditions also soured
views of private prisons.43  Consequently, support for this “indus-
try” and development of private prisons fell out of favor, and “the
private prison industry fell apart.”44
Private interests did not completely disappear from the scene.45
Indeed, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, govern-
ments regularly contracted prison labor out to private parties.46
The private sector often used the prisoners as plantation and fac-
tory laborers.47  When the rise of labor organizations brought an
end to this popular use of prison labor during the twentieth cen-
tury, the private sector found other ways to continue its relation-
ship with correctional institutions.48  For example, the private sector
began providing many prisons with food services, medical services,
and educational services.49  The private sector’s relationship with
the correctional system was primarily limited to this capacity until
the early 1980s.50  At that time, the private sector began operating
half-way homes, facilities for juveniles, alien detention centers, and
work-release programs.51  In 1984, Corrections Corporation of
America began operating the nation’s first private prison since the
nineteenth century.52
39. See Peter J. Duitsman, The Private Prison Experiment: A Private Sector
Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2209, 2215 (1998).  There were
states that simply sold the prison industry to the private sector.  See id.
40. See id.
41. See Wecht, supra note 26, at 816.
42. See McAfee, supra note 38, at 853.
43. See Duitsman, supra note 39, at 2215.
44. Id. at 2216.
45. See id. at 2216-17.
46. See Field, supra note 35, at 651.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 652.  Labor unions viewed this use of prison labor as a threat to
union jobs.  Their increased “strength enabled labor organizations to secure leg-
islation which limited the role of prison labor in the economy.”  Id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See Wecht, supra note 26, at 816.
52. See Company Overview, supra note 2.
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Federal support from both the legislative and executive
branches provided the necessary encouragement for the private
sector to operate this new business successfully.53  In 1988, Con-
gress adopted new legislation authorizing the Attorney General to
enter into agreements with private entities to house prisoners.54  In
1992, President George Bush, believing that privatization could
help achieve the most beneficial economic use of resources, issued
an executive order requiring all federal agencies to encourage state
and local governments to utilize private prisons.55  Combined with
the judiciary’s historical validation of acts that delegate power to
private entities, these measures virtually assured the continued use
of private prisons. 56
53. See id.; see also infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 4013 (1994).  This provision reads, in pertinent part
[t]he Attorney General, in support of United States prisoners in non-
Federal institutions, is authorized to make payments from funds appro-
priated for the support of United States prisoners for (1) necessary
clothing; (2) medical care and necessary guard hire; (3) the housing, care,
and security of persons held in custody of a United States marshal pursu-
ant to Federal law under agreements with State or local units of govern-
ment or contracts with private entities.
Id. § 4013(a).
55. See Warren L. Ratliff, Note, The Due Process Failure of America’s Prison
Privatization Statutes, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371, 404 (1997).  Labeled “Infra-
structure Privatization,” this Executive Order applied to privatization in various
areas, including prisons, airports, roads, waterways, housing, and schools.  The
primary purpose of the act was to “ensure that the United States achieves the
most beneficial economic use of its resources.”  Exec. Order No. 12,803, 57 Fed.
Reg. 19,063 (Apr. 30, 1992).  President Bush believed that “[p]rivate enterprise
and competitively driven improvements are the foundation of our Nation’s econ-
omy and economic growth.” Id.  Thus, he sought to give state and local govern-
ments “greater freedom to privatize infrastructure assets.”  Id.
56. During the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court had not directly considered the
delegation doctrine as it related to private prisons, but it had upheld privatization
in similar contexts.  See Robbins, supra note 21, at 922.  For example, the Court
upheld the Maloney Act, which “authorizes self-regulation of the securities indus-
try.”  Id.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has not invalidated a private delegation
since the New Deal era in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).  See id.
at 919-20.  Thus, private entities did not consider the courts a major threat to their
business.  Apparently they were correct, because in the 1990s, the Supreme Court
and a host of federal courts issued rulings that, as a threshold issue, presumed the
constitutionality of private prisons.  See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S.
399, 402 (1997) (stating that “Tennessee had ‘privatized’ the management of a
number of its correctional facilities, and that consequently a private firm, not the
state government, employed the guards.”); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992); Gi-
ron v. Correctional Corp. of America, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998)
(stating that if a private company operates a prison, the state is directly involved in
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Like the federal government, state support of the private
prison industry also contributed to the industry’s significant growth
over the last decade.  Indeed, just as the federal government began
authorizing privatization of prisons, so did state governments, in-
cluding Alaska.  In 1986, Alaska enacted Alaska Statutes section
33.30.031, which provides that the Commissioner of Health and
Welfare may enter into contracts with public or private entities to
provide for the confinement of inmates when the state lacks proper
facilities.57  These private facilities may be located outside the state
upon the Commissioner’s determination that the state lacks appro-
priate in-state facilities or that out-of-state private facilities are
necessary because of health or security reasons or due to imminent
overcrowding.58  Similarly, Alaska Statutes section 33.30.061
authorizes the Commissioner of Health and Welfare to contract
with private out-of-state facilities to house Alaska prisoners, as
long as the Commissioner determines that rehabilitation or treat-
ment of the prisoner will not be substantially impaired.59
Given the way the federal government and states like Alaska
have supported the private sector’s prison ventures and the boom-
ing market,60 it is perhaps not surprising that by 1996 there were
more than one hundred private jails and prisons located across
twenty-seven states.61  As of 1997, the private prison industry was
some aspects of the prison life).  To date, no federal court has outlawed private
prisons.
57. ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.031 (LEXIS 1998).  The statue provides in pertinent
part
[i]f the commissioner determines that suitable state correctional facilities
are not available, the commissioner may enter into an agreement with a
public or private agency to provide necessary facilities.  Correctional fa-
cilities provided through agreement with a public agency for the deten-
tion and confinement of persons held under authority of state law may
be in this state or in another state.  Correctional facilities provided
through agreement with a private agency must be located in this state
unless the commissioner finds in writing that (1) there is no other rea-
sonable alternative for detention in the state; and (2) the agreement is
necessary because of health or security considerations involving a par-
ticular prisoner or class of prisoners, or because an emergency of pris-
oner overcrowding is imminent.
58. See id.
59. See id. § 33.30.061.
60. As of the end of 1997, other states that support prison privatization in-
clude: Georgia, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
Utah.  See Ratliff, supra note 55, at 407 n.184 (listing the states that have very re-
laxed rules governing private prisons).
61. See Laura Suzanne Farris, Comment, Private Jails in Oklahoma: An Un-
constitutional Delegation of Legislative Authority, 33 TULSA L.J. 959, 959 (1998).
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grossing 550 million dollars annually;62 Alaska is among the twenty-
five states that make use of private prisons.63  Thirty-one states, the
Federal system, and Washington, D.C., reported a housing total of
71,208 prisoners in private facilities in 1999.64  Specifically, Alaska
housed thirty-five percent of its prison population in private facili-
ties during 1999, making it second only to New Mexico’s thirty-nine
percent.65
C. Responses to the Rapid Growth of the Private Prison
Industry66
This rapid growth of the private prison industry has been the
center of much debate.67  Opponents of privatization not only ques-
tion the proponents’ claim that privatization is more cost-efficient
and expedient, but they also insist that the government, not the
private sector, is the proper vehicle for operating prisons.68  Par-
ticularly, they argue that the non-delegation doctrine requires that
governmental entities administer prisons, thereby prohibiting pri-
vate entities from operating them.69  Furthermore, privatization
opponents doubt that the private sector can fully carry out the
goals of the penal system given its obvious primary concern with
62. See Cathy Lazere, Privatizing Prisons: Finance Chiefs Face a Peculiar
Lineup of Problems Helping Move a Business Out of the Public Sector, CFO
MAGAZINE (Feb. 1997), available at <http://www.cfonet.com>.
63. See Ratliff, supra note 55, at 414.
64. See Prisoners in 1999, supra note 18, at 6.
65. See id.
66. The debate surrounding private prisons centers around numerous issues.
While this section focuses on the two most prominent concerns, other concerns
include the quality of the services provided, liability, accountability, dependency,
and flexibility.  For a detailed discussion on the pros and cons of private prisons,
see CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS 41-48 (1990), avail-
able at <http://www.ucc.uconn.edu/~wwwsoci/proscons.html> (last visited Oct. 1,
2000).
67. See Field, supra note 35, at 653-56.
68. See Lazere, supra note 62.  Opponents of private prisons also correctly
point out that private companies reduce a large amount of their costs by hiring
non-union guards.  See The Prison Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec.
1998, available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/98dec/pris2.html>.  In 1996, a
study prepared by the U.S. General Accounting Office was unable to determine
whether there were any cost savings or improved services in private prisons.  See
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Private and Public Prisons:
Studies Comparing Operational Costs and/or Quality of Service (Aug. 16, 1996),
available at <http://www.gao.gov>.
69. See Duitsman, supra note 39, at 2218.
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profit.70  In short, opponents argue that private prisons may fail to
observe prisoners’ constitutional rights properly.71
Proponents of privatization subscribe to the private sector’s
claim that privatization is cheaper and more expedient than a
strictly public prison system.72  Boasting of less bureaucratic road-
blocks, the private sector claims that on average it takes twelve to
eighteen months to build a private prison, while state or federal
governments take at least a year longer.73  Proponents may also in-
sist that privatization does not violate constitutional principles,
namely the non-delegation rule and due process.  They would ar-
gue that the right to punish criminals does not belong to the state,
but to the people who delegate it to the government, which in turn
can contract it to agents.  Adherents to such a view see little differ-
ence between the private sector administering the correctional sys-
tem through contracts and government employees administering
the correctional system.
III.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO TRANSFER PRISONERS
Because the development of Alaska law governing prison
transfers has, in many ways, mirrored the development of the fed-
eral law in this area, it is helpful to discuss the federal law before
outlining Alaska law.  Section A provides a brief account of federal
laws governing prison transfers, while Section B describes Alaska
law.
A. Federal Law
Meachum v. Fano74 is one of the earliest and most significant
cases concerning prison transfers.  In that case, the United States
Supreme Court held that absent a statutory or customary mandate
to the contrary, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not, by itself, “create a liberty interest in prison-
70. See Field, supra note 35, at 662-64.  Stephen Ingley, executive director of
the American Jail Association, stated the primary concern with private prisons
when he insisted that “[a] publicly held corporation’s sole interest is to establish a
profit for its shareholders, and you’re granting the corporation the use of force,
including deadly force.”  Lazere, supra note 62.
71. See Field, supra note 35, at 654.
72. See id.
73. See Lazere, supra note 62.
74. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).  In Meachum, inmates claimed that transfers from a
medium-security prison to a maximum-security facility with less favorable condi-
tions implicated the Due Process Clause.  See id. at 222.  The Court disagreed,
pointing out that there was not a state law which granted the prisoners a liberty
interest not to be transferred for any particular reason.  See id. at 226-29.
HUNTER.FMT.DOC 11/01/00  12:39 PM
330 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [17:2
ers to be free from intrastate prison transfers.”75  In so holding, the
Court rejected the argument that any change in the conditions of a
prisoner’s confinement that impacts the prisoner in a significant
and negative manner automatically triggers due process protec-
tions.76  Thus, unless specifically required by state law, prison ad-
ministrators are not obligated to provide hearings before transfer-
ring prisoners to less hospitable prisons.77  Explaining its support
for granting prison administrations such latitude in transfers, the
Court noted that
given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been consti-
tutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may
confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so
long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate
the Constitution.  The Constitution does not require that the
State have more than one prison for convicted felons; nor does it
guarantee that the convicted prisoner will be placed in any par-
ticular prison if, as is likely, the State has more than one correc-
tional institution . . . .  The conviction has sufficiently extin-
guished the defendant’s liberty interest to empower the State to
confine him in any of its prisons.78
While Meachum provided some guidance on how states should
address the issue of due process and intrastate prison transfers,
there were, and still are, many unresolved nuances concerning
prison transfers.  Four years after Meachum, the Supreme Court
found itself faced with one such nuance in Vitek v. Jones,79 which
concerned the transfer of prisoners to mental institutions.  In that
case, the Court considered a Nebraska statute that authorized the
Director of Correctional Services to transfer prisoners to mental
hospitals upon the determination of a certified physician or psy-
chologist that the prisoner “suffers from mental disease of de-
fect . . . and cannot be given proper treatment” in prison.80  While
the Court did not invalidate the statute on its face, it did affirm the
lower court’s holding that an involuntary transfer from a prison to
a mental hospital “implicated a liberty interest that is protected by
the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment].”81  Ac-
cording to the Court, the statute grants prisoners a liberty interest
whereby a prisoner “could reasonably expect” that he would be
75. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995) (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at
225).
76. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
80. Id. at 483.
81. Id. at 494.
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transferred to a mental hospital only upon a finding that he was
suffering from a mental illness that the prison could not adequately
treat.82  Moreover, the Supreme Court also believed that the stig-
matizing consequences and the “mandatory behavior modification
treatment” involved in this kind of a transfer constitutes a major
change in confinement conditions that amount to a “grievous loss”
and as such, should not be imposed without notice of an adequate
hearing.83  Thus, before transferring prisoners to mental institutions
pursuant to this statute, the Court insisted that Nebraska provide
the prisoner with the following: adequate notice of the potential
transfer, an adversarial hearing before a disinterested party, a writ-
ten statement by the finder of facts cataloging the evidence relied
upon and the reasons for the transfer, and the availability of coun-
sel for indigents.84
Vitek raised important questions in the context of prison trans-
fers.  Having provided the first major limitation on prison transfers,
would the Court now move toward restricting transfers in other
contexts?  This question received an emphatic response two years
later in Olim v. Wakinekona.85  There, the Supreme Court held that
an interstate prison transfer, including one from Hawai’i to Cali-
fornia, does not deprive an inmate of any liberty interest protected
by the Due Process Clause.86  In so holding, the Court reasoned
that, “[j]ust as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will
be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no
justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular
State.”87  The Court went on to note that overcrowding and the
need to separate particular prisoners, among other things, have led
states and the federal government to enact “[s]tatutes and inter-
state agreements [which] recognize that, from time to time, it is
necessary to transfer inmates to prisons in other States.”88  Distin-
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 494-95.
85. 461 U.S. 238 (1983).  In this case, a Hawai’i prison inmate claimed that he
was denied due process when he was transferred from Hawai’i to a state prison in
California.  Noting the prisoner’s disruptive behavior, a one-man hearing commit-
tee recommended that the administrator transfer the prisoner to another facility.
This recommendation was followed.  Since there were no other maximum-security
prisons in the state, the prisoner, who was serving a life sentence without parole
for murder plus additional sentences for rape, robbery, and escape, was to be
transferred out-of-state.  See id.
86. See id. at 251.
87. Id. at 245.
88. Id. at 246.
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guishing this case from Vitek v. Jones, the Court reasoned that
“[c]onfinement in another state, unlike confinement in a mental in-
stitution, is ‘within the normal limits or range of custody which the
conviction has authorized the state to impose.’”89
With this significant and explicit support of out-of-state prison
transfers, the Supreme Court had set the tone.  In the cases that
followed, prisoners sought to use the specific language in particular
statutes to gain various procedural rights.90  The Court put an end
to these attempts in Sandin v. Conner,91 in which it held that the
Due Process Clause did not entitle a prisoner to procedural protec-
tions from administrative decisions that are within the range of
confinement that can normally be expected for one serving a par-
ticular sentence.92  In other words, the Court determined that a
prisoner’s liberty interests resulting from the Due Process Clause
“will be generally limited to freedom from restraint, which . . . im-
poses atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.”93  Because the Court had al-
ready explicitly stated that it is reasonable to expect that prisoners
may be transferred to another prison, including out-of-state pris-
ons, Sandin further solidified judicial support of transfers.94 Indeed,
taken together, these cases allow prison administrators wide lati-
tude in transferring prisoners to out-of-state prisons.  As long as
due process is provided, usually in the form of a classification
hearing, prison administrators can transfer prisoners across state
lines with little or no fear of being subject to judicial chastisement.
With the legal authority to utilize private out-of-state prisons,
states began to increasingly turn to these facilities to provide the
services they were unwilling to provide.95  Alaska soon joined the
ranks.  While using the federal government’s rationale as a model
for addressing the constitutionality of private prisons is helpful, in-
dividual states cannot restrict the analysis to that of federal law.
Indeed, because of our dual system of government, the issue of the
constitutionality of private prisons does not stop at the parameters
89. Id. at 247 (quoting Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225).
90. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (noting that the state created a
protected liberty interest for prisoners by the repeated use of explicitly mandatory
statutory language).
91. 515 U.S. 472.
92. See id. at 487.
93. Id. at 484.
94. See, e.g., Kharrat v. Ramirez, No. 98-16868, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16241,
at *2 (9th Cir. July 15, 1999) (interpreting Sandin as not requiring a due process
hearing before transferring a federal prisoner).
95. See Wecht, supra note 26.
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set by federal law alone.  “[F]ederal constitutional law sets a floor,
not a ceiling, for the provisions of rights . . . .  [A] state is free to
grant its citizens greater constitutional entitlements than they have
under the federal Constitution.”96  Alaska does this with regard to
rehabilitation.  Indeed, Alaska’s state constitution and statutes
provide rights to the general public, including prison inmates, that
are not offered in the United States Constitution or in federal stat-
utes.  Namely, the Alaska Constitution provides that “[c]riminal
administration shall be based on the following: the need for pro-
tecting the public, community condemnation of the offender, the
rights of victims of crimes, restitution from the offender, and the
principle of reformation.”97
B. Alaska Law
Like the federal courts, the Alaska courts have also supported
prison transfers.  One of the most significant cases concerning
Alaska prison transfers is Dwyer v. State.98  In that case, the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the Alaska Constitution does not pre-
clude the transfer of Alaska prisoners to out-of-state federal pris-
ons.99  The court relied largely on 18 U.S.C. § 5003100 which author-
izes the Attorney General to contract with the states to house
federal prisoners, and Alaska Statutes section 33.30.060,101 which
96. 2 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 12.01 (Donald T.
Kramer ed., 2d ed. 1993).
97. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12 (emphasis added).
98. 449 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1969).  Here, inmate Dwyer was transferred from a
prison in Alaska to a federal prison in California because of overcrowding in
Alaska prisons.  See id. at 282.
99. See id. at 284.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 5003(a) (1994) provides that if the director of the Bureaus of
Prisons determines that adequate personnel and facilities are available, the Attor-
ney General of the United States may contract with “the proper officials of a State
or Territory for the custody, care, subsistence, education, treatment, and training
of persons convicted of criminal offenses in the courts of such State or Territory.”
101. This statute was repealed in 1986.  See 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws § 12 ch. 88.
It read in pertinent part
if the commissioner determines that suitable state prison facilities are not
available, he may enter into an agreement with the proper authorities of
the United States, another state, or a political subdivision of this state to
provide for the safekeeping, care, subsistence, proper government, disci-
pline and to provide programs for the reformation and rehabilitation and
treatment of prisoners.  Prison facilities made available to the commis-
sioner by agreement may be in this state, or in any other state, territory,
or possession of the United States.
(quoted in Dwyer, 449 P.2d at 282-83).
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authorizes Alaska’s Commissioner of Health and Welfare to enter
similar contracts regarding Alaska prisoners.102
Like courts before it, the Dwyer court rejected the argument
that these kinds of statutes constitute an improper delegation of
power.103  Essentially, proponents of the improper delegation of
power argument maintain that the United States Constitution does
not explicitly or implicitly delegate to Congress the power to con-
fine state prisoners.104  Consequently, they argue that statutes al-
lowing for the transfer of state prisoners to federal facilities are un-
constitutional.105  Disagreeing with this rationale, the Dwyer court
insisted that “under our dual form of government there may be a
pooling of state and federal power for cooperative action, to the
end that the public welfare of both state and nation may be simul-
taneously promoted, where both have a common concern, is now
well settled.”106  Thus, the court unanimously agreed that incarcera-
tion of Alaska prisoners in out-of-state federal prisons was lawful.107
While Dwyer settled the question of the legality of transfers to
public out-of-state prisons, important nuances concerning transfers
remained unclear, and nearly a decade later the Alaska Supreme
Court was still answering questions.  Following Dwyer, Alaska law
governing transfers from one prison to another was further devel-
oped in cases where prisoners sought to compel the Division of
Corrections108 (“DC”) to modify sentences in accordance with rec-
ommendations by the sentencing court.  In each of these cases, the
modification sought was a transfer to the prison initially recom-
mended by the sentencing judge.
Rust v. State109 is one of the most important of these cases.  In
that case, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the DC is not obli-
gated to comply with a sentencing court’s recommendations con-
cerning rehabilitation, and absent a compelling need, the sentenc-
ing court lacks authority to order the DC to incarcerate an inmate
102. See Dwyer, 449 P.2d at 283.
103. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F.Supp. 630 (D.C.N.Y. 1951) (allowing
the federal government and the state to transfer federal prisoners to state prisons);
Duncan v. Ulmer, 191 A.2d 617 (Me. 1963) (upholding the transfer of a state pris-
oner in a federal facility).
104. See Dwyer, 449 P.2d at 283.
105. See id.
106. Id. (quoting Duncan v. Madigan, 278 F.2d 695, 696 (9th Cir. 1960)).
107. See Dwyer, 449 P.2d at 284.
108. The Division of Corrections was the predecessor to the Department of
Corrections.
109. 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).
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in a particular facility.110  The sentencing court recommended that
the defendant, Rust, be incarcerated in Anchorage because there
he could improve his dyslexia, increase his vocational skills, and be
closer to his family.111  When Rust was then incarcerated in Juneau,
he sought a transfer to Anchorage in accordance with the sentenc-
ing court’s recommendation.112  The supreme court, reasoning that
the Alaska Legislature statutorily committed the power to control
the correction system to the DC and not to the judiciary, affirmed
the lower court’s refusal to order a transfer on this basis.113
Significantly, the court’s analysis of Rust’s transfer did not end
there.  The court went on to hold that prisoners are entitled to nec-
essary medical treatment if a health care provider determines that
such treatment will substantially help.114  In such instances, the right
to treatment is fundamental and the judiciary has a duty to inter-
vene in DC decisions that challenge this right.115  Accordingly, the
validity of Rust’s transfer rested on whether his claims rose to the
level of a fundamental right.116  If, on remand, Rust showed that
medical treatment would substantially help his medical condition
of dyslexia, it would qualify as a fundamental right and Rust would
prevail.117
While the Rust opinion acknowledged important rights for
prisoners, the court was silent on whether any weight should be
given to Rust’s contention that incarceration in Anchorage would
improve his vocational skills and would allow him to be closer to
his family.  The court was silent on these claims because it did not
believe that Rust’s case “present[ed] an appropriate vehicle for de-
lineation of the contours of a prisoner’s right to rehabilitation un-
der either [a]rticle I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution or
[Alaska Statutes section] 33.30.020.”118  Instead, the court based its
determination on the statute requiring provision of medical care
and the Constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.119  Nonetheless, it would only be a matter of time before
110. See id. at 137-38.
111. See id. at 135.
112. See id. at 136.
113. See id. at 136-38.
114. See id. at 143.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 142-43 (stating that the essential test is one of medical necessity,
not simply desirability).
117. See id. at 143-44.
118. Id. at 144 n.35.  This statute was repealed in 1986.  See Act of June 5, 1986,
§ 12, 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 88.
119. See Rust, 582 P.2d at 142-43.
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the court would have to directly address claims that the distance
between the prisoner and his family played a part in rehabilitation.
Another important case addressing sentence modification that
has contributed greatly to the law on prison transfers is Abraham v.
State.120  Extending the holding of Rust, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that judicial intervention with the DC’s designation of a par-
ticular facility is also appropriate if the inmate shows that the origi-
nal designation denied him rights to rehabilitation in violation of
article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution.121  Essentially, the
inmate has to show that a transfer is necessary to his rehabilita-
tion.122  In his appeal, Abraham claimed that because of his addic-
tion to alcohol, his language barrier, and his Native diet, a prison
outside of Bethel would not possess the programs or environment
needed to rehabilitate him.123  According to the inmate, Bethel
would suffice because of its large Native Alaskan population; there
the prisoner would have the necessary communication skills to par-
ticipate in rehabilitation programs.124  Because Abraham had not
received an evidentiary hearing to determine the validity of his
claim that he had been denied rehabilitation, the case was re-
manded for such a determination.125  This case had significant
meaning in the context of transfers because it articulated the
court’s belief that prisoners may be transferred if the current facil-
ity cannot accommodate their rehabilitative needs.126
Finally, LaBarbera v. State127 helped to shape Alaska law gov-
erning prison transfers by addressing the issue of how courts should
handle a request to modify a sentence.  In that case, the Alaska Su-
preme Court, refusing to allow a prisoner to be transferred to a
therapeutic community correction house in order to complete a re-
habilitation program, elaborated on its holdings in Rust and Abra-
ham.128  The court explained that, although prisoners have a right to
rehabilitation under article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution,
courts cannot, at the time of sentencing, designate a particular
prison or program for the prisoner.129  To the contrary, “it is only
after a demonstrated failure to provide an appropriate rehabilita-
120. 585 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1978).
121. See id. at 533.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 528.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 534.
126. See id. at 533-34.
127. 598 P.2d 947 (Alaska 1979).
128. See id. at 949.
129. See id.
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tion program that judicial intervention is proper.”130  Thus, to be
transferred, a prisoner must successfully sue the DC in a civil ac-
tion by demonstrating that the DC’s designation denied the pris-
oner’s right to rehabilitation.131
IV.  BRANDON V. STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Brandon v. State Department of Corrections132 serves as the
most recent development of Alaska law governing prison transfers.
In Brandon, the Alaska Supreme Court held that because Alaska
law creates a fundamental right to rehabilitation, a superior court
may hear appeals from administrative hearings to transfer prison-
ers to out-of-state facilities.133  In justifying its position, the court
pointed to Owen v. Matsumoto,134 where it was held that “[a]ny al-
leged violation of fundamental constitutional rights must be af-
forded judicial review.”135  The court further explained its contribu-
tion to prisoner rights by recognizing that the Alaska Constitution
creates a fundamental right to rehabilitation,136 noting that Alaska
Statutes section 33.30.061 prevents out-of-state transfers that sub-
stantially impair a prisoner’s rehabilitation or treatment.137  Justi-
fying the need to protect prisoners from unrestricted transfers, the
court noted that “[v]isiting is the most direct link for an inmate
with the world left behind.  Indeed, visiting is indispensable to any
realistic program of rehabilitation.”138
130. Id.  See also State v. Hiser, 924 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996)
(explaining that according to Rust and LaBarbera
a sentencing court has no power to issue a criminal judgment that dic-
tates the particulars of a prisoner’s care and/or treatment. These matters
are entrusted in the first instance to the discretion of the Department of
Corrections.  If a prisoner believes that the Department has abused that
discretion, he or she can bring suit against the Department to correct the
situation. But the superior court has no authority to tell the Department
in advance how it shall care for its sentenced prisoners).
131. LaBarbera lost his appeal.  The court considered his desired transfer to a
therapeutic community house too lenient of a punishment.  Granting LaBarbera
the transfer would have effectively reduced his fifteen-year sentence for man-
slaughter and robbery to a five-year sentence.  See LaBarbera, 598 P.2d at 947.
132. 938 P.2d 1029 (Alaska 1997).
133. See id. at 1033.
134. 859 P.2d 1308 (Alaska 1993).
135. Brandon, 938 P.2d at 1031 (quoting Owen, 859 P.2d at 1310).
136. See id. at 1032.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 1032 n.2 (quoting MUSHLIN, supra note 96, §12.00).
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The court’s holding relied upon its determination that classifi-
cation hearings139 are properly categorized as adjudicative pro-
ceedings, and as such, are subject to judicial review.140  Indeed, this
was the first time that an Alaska court explicitly regarded classifi-
cation hearings as adjudicative proceedings.  The court reasoned
that “classification hearing[s] [contain] many of the qualities of an
adjudication.”141  For example, the court noted that not only are
prisoners entitled to proper notice before a classification hearing,
but they are also permitted to present evidence before classifica-
tion committees.142  Moreover, pursuant to Alaska Statutes section
33.30.061(b), the classification committee must consider whether or
not the transfer will significantly impair the prisoner’s rehabilita-
tion.143  Thus, for all practical purposes, the court determined that
classification hearings may be considered adjudicative hearings.144
Furthermore, the court determined that a reviewable record is
produced at every classification hearing, because these hearings are
tape recorded, transcribed, and contain a written statement by the
finder of fact as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the
decision (pursuant to the Alaska Administrative Code title 22, sec-
tion 05.216).145  This “reviewable record” provides teeth to what
could otherwise merely be a nominal contribution to prisoner
rights.  As a consequence, DOC decisions to transfer prisoners are
139. As the name suggests, a classification hearing is an administrative process
used to designate the facility where the prisoner will serve time.  During a classifi-
cation hearing, the prisoner’s due process rights do not extend past the “expecta-
tion of fair and impartial allocation of the resources of the prison system.”
McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221, 1237 (Alaska 1975).
140. It is unclear from the court’s opinion whether the review must be granted
before or after the prisoner is transferred out-of-state.  Because most criminals are
required to undergo punishment while they await appeal, it is plausible that the
prisoner would be shipped to Arizona before his appeal is determined.
141. Brandon, 938 P.2d at 1033.  The court previously listed qualities of adjudi-
cation to include
adequate notice to persons to be bound by the adjudication, the parties’
rights to present and rebut evidence and argument, a formulation of is-
sues of law and fact in terms of specific parties and specific transactions,
a rule of finality specifying the point in the proceeding when presenta-
tions end and a final decision is rendered, and any other procedural ele-
ments necessary for a conclusive determination of the matter in question.
Id. at 1032 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2) (1982)).
142. See id. at 1033.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
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not only subject to judicial review, but the records produced in
these hearings make it feasible to do so properly.146
V.  HOUSING ALASKA PRISONERS OUT-OF-STATE INFRINGES
UPON THEIR RIGHT TO REHABILITATION
Experts across the social sciences agree that visitation is the
most important component of rehabilitation.147  Visitation plays
such a key role because it prevents prisoners from being “socialized
to the life of an inmate [and helps transform them into] individuals
who have the necessary skills and emotional stability to face up to
their responsibilities as citizens, parents and spouses.”148  Moreover,
when prisoners are able to maintain contact with family members
during incarceration, they are more likely to sustain their relation-
ships after their release.149  Inmates who have families to support
them upon release are less likely to return to a life of crime.150
“Preservation of the family unit is important to the reintegration of
the confined person and decreases the possibility of recidivism
upon release.”151  Not surprisingly, studies also show that tensions
are less intense within prisons where inmates receive regular vis-
its.152
In Brandon, even the Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged
that visitation plays an indispensable role in any realistic rehabilita-
146. See id.
147. See, e.g., MUSHLIN, supra note 96, § 12.00 n.3 (noting that “[t]here is little,
if any, disagreement that the opportunity to be visited by friends and relatives is
more beneficial to the confined person than any other form of communication.”)
(citation omitted).  See also Brandon v. State Dep’t of Corr., 938 P.2d 1029, 1032
n.2 (Alaska 1997) (noting that “[v]irtually every statement on visitation by prison
officials . . . and every major textbook on corrections stresses the critical nature of
visitation both in terms of the reduction of tension inside the prison and the facili-
tation of the ultimate rehabilitation of the prisoner by strengthening his ties with
the ‘free world.’”) (citation omitted).
148. Justin Brooks & Kimberly Bahna, “It’s a Family Affair” – The Incarcera-
tion of the American Family: Confronting Legal and Social Issues, 28 U.S.F. L.
REV. 271, 277 (1994).
149. See id. at 276-77.
150. See id. at 285.  It is important to note that the positive influence of visita-
tions may not be unidirectional; access to a parent, even if that parent is incarcer-
ated, may serve as a positive influence on the children of inmates and mitigate fu-
ture risks that these children will likewise engage in criminal conduct and thereby
threaten public safety.  See id. at 272, 276.
151. Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 468 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (quoting MODEL SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS ACT § 4-115 cmt.
(1979)).
152. See Brandon, 938 P.2d at 1032 n.2.
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tive effort.153  In reference to the social science research findings,
the Brandon court noted that
[n]o single factor has been proven to be more directly correlated
with the objective of a crime-free return to society than visiting.
The reason for this is almost too obvious to state: “Strained ties
with family and friends increase the difficulty of making the
eventual transition back to the community.”  If those ties are to
be preserved, visiting is imperative.154
Despite recognition of this overwhelming evidence, the court
shied away from declaring that visitation is indispensable to reha-
bilitation.  Instead, the court noted that “[o]ur recognition that visi-
tation privileges are a component of the constitutional right to re-
habilitation does not define their required scope or the permissible
limits on their exercise.”155  The scope and limitation of prisoners’
rights will have to be defined in further adjudications.  By including
this statement, the court diminished the importance of this case as
a powerful statement of prisoners’ rights.
Given the Brandon court’s recognition that visitation is an in-
dispensable aspect of rehabilitation, its allowance for judicial re-
view of a prison administration’s decision to transfer an inmate
hundreds of miles away to a private Arizona facility falls far short
of protecting the prisoner’s fundamental rights.156  Since rehabilita-
tion is a fundamental right under Alaska law, the virtual elimina-
tion of visitation is unjustifiable, with or without judicial review.
This is particularly unjustifiable when the out-of-state transfers are
motivated strictly on financial factors.157  Unless the preservation of
Alaskans’ fundamental rights is considered contingent upon the
health of the state’s budget, transferring prisoners like Brandon is
improper, even with due process and judicial review.
153. See id.
154. Id. (quoting MUSHLIN, supra note 96, §12.00).
155. Id.
156. Cultural differences experienced by Alaskans in Arizona prisons arguably
may impede rehabilitation.  Although Alaska prisoners may share the same na-
tional citizenship as the remaining American prison population, for some Alas-
kans (those facing striking differences in language, social, religious, and other cul-
tural values) the similarities to other prisoners may end there.  This may have a
dramatic negative impact on adaptation to prison life and subsequent effective use
of rehabilitation programs (e.g., work training) that the prisons may offer.  See
generally MICHAL PLACHTA, TRANSFER OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS AND DOMESTIC LEGISLATION 68-73 (1993) (discussing the difficul-
ties “foreigners” face compared to other prisoners).
157. The primary reason given for housing Alaska prisoners in out of state pri-
vate facilities is that it is cheaper and more expedient than building prisons in
Alaska.
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Even when combined with current statutory provisions, Bran-
don still fails to protect prisoners’ rights adequately.  Upon first
glance, it appears that Brandon’s allowance for judicial review of
classification hearings, coupled with the prohibition by Alaska
Statutes section 33.30.061 against transfers that substantially impair
rehabilitation, is sufficient to protect prisoners’ right to rehabilita-
tion.158  However, since it has been established that visitation is a
key element to rehabilitation, transfers to out-of-state private pris-
ons substantially interfere with a crucial aspect of rehabilitation in
virtually all cases.  This is especially true if prisoners lack the re-
sources to fund family visits to Arizona or any other state outside
Alaska.  Even where an inmate does not receive visitors on a
regular basis, incarceration in Alaska remains key: if visiting the in-
carcerated in Alaska is not a simple undertaking, even on an infre-
quent basis, it is surely far more difficult to visit an inmate incar-
cerated in a prison located in a distant state.
The key role visitation plays in rehabilitation is a major issue
that Brandon hints at but fails to follow through to its logical con-
clusion.  Rather than mandating a per se rule which would prohibit
out-of-state prison transfers, the court only went so far as to permit
judicial review of such transfer decisions.  This inefficient result re-
quires each prisoner to seek judicial review every time the commis-
sioner orders an out-of-state transfer, or to have prisoners bring
civil claims alleging an infringement on rehabilitation due to the
lack of visitation when the Alaska Supreme Court has already ac-
cepted that visitation is indispensable to rehabilitation.  If visitation
is indispensable to rehabilitation, it seems logical to prohibit out-
of-state transfers, preventing the de facto elimination of prisoners’
visitation rights.
VI.  CONCLUSION
As the Alaska Constitution states, prisoners have a fundamen-
tal right to rehabilitation.  Visitation is one of the most important
elements to rehabilitation.  Transfers to private out-of-state prisons
substantially impair visitation, thus impairing rehabilitation.  Ac-
cordingly, such transfers violate Alaska’s Constitution.  Brandon’s
recognition that administrative decisions on prison transfers are
subject to judicial review is a critical step in the right direction.
158. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  The statute provides in perti-
nent part that “[t]he commissioner may designate an out-of-state facility under
this section only if the commissioner determines that rehabilitation or treatment
of the prisoner will not be substantially impaired.”  ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.061(b)
(LEXIS 1998).
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Further steps need to be taken in order to safeguard the constitu-
tional rights of Alaska prisoners.
Shymeka L. Hunter
